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Abstract 
 
Astroturfing—fake grassroots communications about an issue of public interest—is 
further problematized in digital space. Because digitally mediated communications easily 
accommodate pseudonymous and anonymous speech, digital ethos depends on a finding 
a proper balance between the ability to create pseudonymous or anonymous online 
presences, and the public need for transparency in public speech. Analyzing such content 
requires analysis of media forms and analysis of the honesty of speakers themselves. This 
chapter applies Michel Foucault's articulation of parrhesia—the ability to speak freely 
and the concomitant public duties it requires of speakers—to digital communications. It 
first theorizes digital parrhesia, then outlines a techno-semiotic methodological approach 
with which researchers—and the public—can consider online advocacy speech. The 
chapter then analyzes two very different instances of astroturfing using the techno-
semiotic method in order to demonstrate the generalizability of the theory of digital 
parresia, and the utility of the techno-semiotic approach.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Astroturfing—fake grassroots campaigns about matters of public interest—presents a 
particular problem to researchers, particularly to those interested in studying the content 
of advocacy speech. Specifically, the content may be true, and even compelling, but if the 
honesty of the speaker is questionable, that truth may be a house of cards.  
 
In this chapter, we expand Pramad K. Nayar's application of parrhesia to digital space 
(2010). Relying, as did Nayar, on Foucault's articulation of this ancient Greek concept 
(Foucault, 2001), this chapter derives a model for analyzing the credibility of digital 
advocacy speech, and thus a model for truth-telling in the digital public sphere. 
Parrhesia, or the ability to speak freely, implies three public duties for speakers: to speak 
the truth, to sincerely believe that truth, and to honestly represent themselves when 
speaking. Astroturfing, which conceals identities in order to reduce the risks of speaking 
truth to power—or to the public—always fails the latter duty.  
 
In networked space, however, pseudonymous and anonymous speech can work both 
democratically and propagandistically. This chapter proposes that digital parrhesia helps 
evaluate astroturfing and helps understand why such evaluation matters. By using digital 
parrhesia to analyze astroturfing online, this chapter's analytic model aims to contribute 
to the preservation—and maybe the revivification of—a culture of truth-telling.  
 
 
Background: Astroturfing is not for Free 
 
On May 16, 2010, the French popular science show E=M6 featured a story about "triple 
play boxes." A new communication service in France, the boxes allowed users to access 
the Internet, television, and telephone services at the same time and through the same 
provider. E=M6 achieved its popularity by mixing the points of view of scientists and 
technicians with discussion of consumer uses and needs—thus, the boxes were well-
suited for a story on this program. Every broadcast of E=M6—named for M6, its 
channel—follows a format similar to this episode, where the broadcast first explained the 
science behind the broadcast in terms fit for a general audience, and second explored the 
contextual uses of the boxes.  
 
This episode featured a happy French family, a couple with two children, who discovered 
the features of the box. When the mother called the children for dinner during their 
favorite cartoon, the box allowed them to pause the program and store it on the box's hard 
drive. When the family took a walk, and worried they would miss an evening show, the 
father programmed the box using his smartphone. In these ways, the family met their 
entertainment needs thanks to the little box. But shortly after the episode aired, fans and 
customers, re-watching the episode on M6's Web site, noticed that the box something 
called a Freebox, available exclusively from the Internet provider Free. Fans began to 
discuss the show and the Web site Freenews.fr, created by an association of Free 
customers, reported that the family was, in fact, a fake: the "father" was Free's marketing 
director, and the "mother" was Free's press secretary (Freenews, 2011a; Freenews, 
2011b).  
 
Other Web sites and radio and television news reported the dishonesty; ultimately, the 
French broadcasting authority, the CSA, warned M6 that its astroturfing attempt 
contravened articles 20 and 22 from its broadcasting convention: "The company must 
verify the validity and the sources of information [and] must show honesty and rigor in 
the presentation and treatment of information" (Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel, 2011). 
A core concern of the circulation and presentation of information in public space is one 
central to the question of authorship and credibility: astroturfing. In this case, what began 
as a simple five-minute report on a new digital media technology ended in astroturfing 
practices being exposed by both digital and traditional media.  
 
This clear case of astroturfing—and how it was uncovered—allows us to observe the 
interrelationship between astroturfing, digital media use, and the exposure of astroturfing. 
In France, much as in the United States, audiences are accustomed to marketing and 
public relations. The Freebox/M6 case became a scandal not because it was marketing, 
but because it was misleading—the family that enjoyed the Freebox was parented by 
employees of Free. These employees violated what we see as a fundamental factor 
governing digital communication space: parrhesia, in which the public duty of speakers 
is to speak the truth, to sincerely believe that truth, and to honestly represent themselves 
when speaking. 
 
Building a theory of digital parrhesia 
 
The act of astroturfing may be thought of as manufacturing support for an issue, or 
attempting to mislead politicians, news media, or citizens about the origins of such 
support. The use of the term dates at least to 1985, when United States Senator Lloyd 
Bentsen said, about receiving letters that promoted insurance companies' interests, that, 
"A fellow from Texas can tell the difference between grass roots and Astroturf. This is 
generated mail" (qtd. in Sager, 2009). Astroturfing attempts to leech the legitimacy held 
by grassroots movements, pretending that it is a response from below to governance from 
above.  
 
Growing access to the tools of digital media production, from email to Web site design to 
video, have created new communication spaces and communities. Citizens, corporations, 
and governments all have enhanced abilities to engage in public dialogue about their 
beliefs, products, and intents—and enhanced abilities to conceal their identities while 
doing so. Thus, digital communication space introduces new problems for ethos; this 
realm depends on a proper balance between the ability to create pseudonymous or 
anonymous online presences, and the public need for transparency in public speech. 
 
Pseudonymity and anonymity surely have their place, for they accommodate truthful 
comments from individuals who may have valid reasons—from fear of community 
disapproval to the fear of being "disappeared" by a government—to conceal their 
identity. Yet, corporations, governments, and their public relations or advertising 
companies can exploit that same anonymity. What may be legitimately defensive for an 
individual becomes a public relations tactic for an organization attempting to reduce the 
risk of advocacy. But if in the digital era, astroturfing is easier than ever, so is learning 
the true identity of astroturfers, as seen in the Freebox/M6 scandal.  
 
In order to fully understand the role of digital communications in astroturfing, and to 
develop a method to analyze digital astroturfing, this chapter turns to Foucault's 
articulation of the ancient Greek concept parrhesia (2001). Commonly translated as "free 
speech," parrhesia implies that when one has the ability to speak freely, one also has the 
public duty to speak the truth, to sincerely believe that truth, and to honestly represent 
oneself when speaking—criteria worth repeating, and to which this chapter will 
repeatedly return. 
 
This concept was first ported to digital space to make an affirmative argument for the 
value of the Web site WikiLeaks as a defender of "the agora of information" and a culture 
of digital truth-telling (Nayar, 2010). The argument is compelling, but the implications of 
digital parrhesia are both wider and deeper than simply defending WikiLeaks, because, 
according to Nayar himself, digital cultures generate new communities: "Digital cultures 
create a new communications culture, which generates a new community, the global civil 
society . . . and the globalisation of conscience. [WikiLeaks] is an embodiment of this 
new form of communications-leading-to-community, a digital parrhesia" (Nayar, 2010, 
p. 29). Under this view, new communities emerge whose participants may be judged by 
whether they adhere to the duties implied by parrhesia. Discourse under parrhesia 
centers on truth-telling in the service of community. Digital parrhesia is then a necessary 
component of digital communities, like parrhesia was a necessity in the Greek agora. 
 
Risk balances the duty to speak truthfully in digital parrhesia, and in what Foucault calls 
the "parrhesiastic game," speakers balance the risk to themselves with the duty to speak 
the truth. "In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of 
persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and 
security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral 
apathy" (Foucault, 2001, p. 19-20). If engaging in the parrhesiastic game is courageous, 
then undermining and exploiting the game is cowardly. Moreover, doing so suspends or 
negates the rule of the game, and thus suspends—and threatens—the role of the society 
as a discursive community as well. 
 
Digital parrhesia, then, may be considered a discursive space where a wide range of 
individuals can engage in truth-telling practices, and a space whose boundaries—the duty 
to speak the truth, to believe that truth, to honestly represent oneself, all though online 
media—also provide the beginnings of a critical framework for assessing the credibility 
of digital texts. Clearly, identifying digital parrhesia as a discursive space and defining 
the boundaries of that space is useful; it allows us to distinguish between digital actors 
who seek to reveal the truth, or to conceal it. Getting there, however, requires a clear 
methodology. And the importance of good methods here cannot be overstated; accusing 
an author of astroturfing, under digital parrhesia, is tantamount to accusing that author of 
propagandistic lying.  
 
Digital parrhesia lends itself to semiotic analysis because it identifies different levels of 
speech. At each level, truth-claims hinge on the medium where the speech occurs, how 
the speech is distributed, the content of the speech, and the identity of the speaker herself. 
People who have the ability to speak freely in digital culture also have the obligation to 
become Bentsen's "fellow from Texas" who can distinguish between grassroots content 
that emerges from below, and content that is astroturfed down from above. 
Distinguishing between the two often is contingent on questions of authorship and 
discourse. In order to help researchers make this distinction, the next section 
operationalizes digital parrhesia by integrating the author and the medium into what we 
call a "techno-semiotic" method of analysis.  
 
 
Building a techno-semiotic method for digital parrhesia 
 
The idea that every human construct has different levels of meaning is the basis of 
semiotics, which itself can be a key that unlocks the structure of communication by 
revealing patterns of meaning at those levels. Semiotics aims to build builds a coherent 
approach for analyzing units of meaning. The goal of this chapter is not to solve 
questions asked by generations of semioticians, from the foundational work (Saussure, 
1977; Barthes, 1968; Morris, 1964; Greimas, 1989) to scholars of today (Eco, 1976; 
Klinkenberg, 2000; Veron, 1988), but rather to operationalize their theoretical work into 
an easily applied method. The different steps of this method have much in common with 
the analytical skills used in the humanities and literature studies. And the "techno" part of 
the techno-semiotic method does not require advanced technical knowledge, but rather 
awareness that a medium itself is a complex object or condition.  
 
In this way, we propose to understand online statements and the systems in which they 
evolve. Of the object of research—in the case of this chapter, an advocacy statement that 
may or may not be astroturfing—four questions must be asked: Where does the statement 
occur? How is the statement enunciated? What does the statement say? And who said it? 
These questions correspond to different levels of meaning: the medium, the document, 
the text, and the discourse. In the techno-semiotic method, the levels, while having 
separate and identifiable characteristics, are not isolated from each other. Rather, each 
level plays a role and influences, and is influenced by, the other levels. So each level 
must be considered through two points of view: looking at properties intrinsic to each 
specific level of meaning, and looking at how the levels of meaning can and do interact.  
 
First, the practice of semiotics in social science, communication and media studies has 
shown that exhaustive analyses must not restrict themselves only to content—the 
technical apparatus of communication must be considered as well. Davallon, for example, 
suggested that what makes objects of communication research unique is is their "techno-
semiotic weight" (2004). From the sheet of paper to the PDF document, every document 
has material features that transform the way we receive and perceive signs, but also 
influences our research practices and the meanings we give to objects. This is but one 
aspect of the method—particularly significant at the level of the medium—which is 
highly influential, but not deterministic, because as Wright suggested, a technical 
apparatus does not determine communicative processes, which are themselves social, not 
technological, in nature (1986). Thus, the first step in describing an object is to describe 
the technical apparatus and the system that produces it. For example, this method always 
asks whether articles published in The New York Times newspaper, and on nytimes.com, 
are the same? Is a 1933 speech by United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt the 
same when heard on the radio then, and when read in a history textbook today? These are 
the types of questions that the techno-semiotic method prompts: Where does the 
statement occur? And how does the medium in which it occurs affect the meaning of the 
statement? These questions serve to avoid the pitfall of technological determinism, while 
still insisting that a statement's technological context affects its meaning. 
 
The second step of this method takes us to the level of how a statement is enunciated. 
This is closely related to the where, or to the medium, but is distinct. Rather than looking 
at the medium and its systems—the differences between New York Times stories in print 
or online, or the differences between a contemporaneous radio speech and a textbook—
the second step turns to the document itself, and the process by which it comes into 
being. The question of how a statement is enunciated regards how statements become text 
and how those texts are disseminated. For example, an author rarely publishes 
handwritten drafts of her work. Instead, she uses word processing software, then sends a 
copy—sometimes digital, sometimes paper—to her editor, who may send it along for 
further review by peers and copyeditors, until the document is transformed into a 
printable version for the printers. Thus, techno-semiotic analysis requires that attention be 
paid to how documents are produced and distributed, and to how those processes affect 
and inform the meanings of statements.  
 
Of course, analyses of communication texts are commonly concerned with the content of 
statements, which is our third level: what the statement says, returning to the classic core 
question of finding meaning in a text. A news story viewed on YouTube will be different 
than the same news story viewed during a CNN broadcast. Neither will be understood in 
exactly the same way, nor will they be understood the same way as the script of the 
broadcast, or the audio track heard without the video. The medium informs this level, 
because audiences receive different media differently. Nonetheless, texts—particularly 
news and digital advocacy—have claims. Those claims must be identified and evaluated, 
and understood in the context of the previous two levels: to what extent the medium 
informs those claims, and to what extent how those claims are presented and distributed 
affects their reception.  
 
The final level of meaning to investigate is the discourse. The analysis of discourse can 
be as complex as the definition of the term itself. In the techno-semiotic method, research 
into the content of the message requires gathering some information about the speaker, in 
order to understand his intentions and purposes. When considering a statement, the 
question of who said it is then a more global question about the speaker and her relation 
to the statement. Analysis at the level of discourse is closely and strongly interrelated 
with the other levels of meaning. Through analysis at the levels of the technics of the 
medium, of the production and distribution of a text, and of the content of a text, a 
holistic understanding of a statement and its meaning begins to emerge. To paraphrase 
and expound upon Marshall McLuhan, if the message is the medium, then we can say 
that the discourse is the medium: analysis of the medium reveals the space in which the 
discourse can evolve, can be influenced and transformed, but also for whom it was 
crafted and to what purpose it was deployed. Meaning is conveyed through discourse and 
its intent; the techno-semiotic model thus treats the author, in a way, as text.  
 
Traditionally, mass media have served to confer status upon certain speakers—news 
anchors of major television networks, editors of major newspapers, politicians, and so 
forth—but in digital communication space, traditional status conferral is dramatically 
weakened. When discussing matters of public interest in digital communication space, we 
argue, status is conferred by the honesty of the speaker. Her discourse must fulfill her 
public parrhesiastic duties, which, again, are: to speak the truth, to sincerely believe that 
truth, and to honestly represent herself when speaking. As we will see in the examples 
that follow, analyzing the last of these—honest representation—is at the crux of 
determining whether advocacy speech is astroturfing.  
 
 
Astroturfing the European Commission: from public consultation to risk 
manipulation 
 
In a previous project, Allard-Huver tried to understand how negotiating the concept of 
risk in the European public sphere transformed advocacy communications (2011). He 
analyzed the public deliberation from 2002 to 2009 surrounding the 91/414 European 
Directive regulating pesticides, finding that some public feedback was surprisingly 
similar, considering letters were supposedly from individuals writing individually. Using 
the techno-semiotic method, it quickly became clear that an astroturfing attempt was 
being made within the European legislative process.  
 
During its public consultation for the report Thematic strategy on the sustainable use of 
pesticides, the European Commission invited pesticide stakeholders to send comments, 
suggest modifications, put forward reservations and criticize the commission's first 
publication, Towards a thematic strategy on the sustainable use of pesticides (European 
Commission, 2009). Some feedback that initially seemed to be from individuals appeared 
to be a part of a coordinated campaign, when seen through the prism of digital parrhesia 
and evaluated by the techno-semiotic method. These questions followed from the 
method: 
 
First, is the European Commission Web site, as a digital public sphere, more subject to 
astroturfing attempts? The first level of inquiry focuses on the Web site—the media 
layer—of the European Commission, its functions, and the ways it created a digital 
public sphere. The site functioned in three ways: it served as a medium that raised public 
awareness of the problems of pesticides; it built a digital discussion space for public 
participation in debates about pesticide use; and now, it serves as a public archive for a 
completed process. Each function makes clear that the Web site is a mediator between 
different publics. The site, by enunciating the perspectives of European legislators as well 
as those of other stakeholders, suggests that the rules of parrhesia are at work; in turn, 
stakeholders, by participating in the process, imply that they accept those rules. But the 
physical and material distance introduced by Internet communication itself must not be 
forgotten. On the Web site, distinguishing speakers can be difficult, and one can easily 
submit false information, or falsify an identity; this admits the possibility of astroturfing 
into the process. Nevertheless, because the site also plays the role of an archive, the 
public—and researchers—can investigate the advocacy speech therein, and how 
parrhesia operates in these debates. 
 
Now, we can look at the third level of meaning: the content of the documents. The 
principal element of our interrogation is that some of the stakeholder texts are remarkably 
similar. The text of Birgitt Walz-Tylla is almost the same as the text sent by Carlo Lick, 
by B. Birk or Joseph Haber. For example, all four letters include this text: "As a scientist 
who has dedicated most of his career to researching and developing crop protection 
products, I believe there are a number of elements of this strategy that need to be further 
considered," even Walz-Tylla, a woman who, humorously, has "dedicated most of his 
career" (emphasis ours) (European Commission, 2009). Here, the content analysis is less 
the analysis of signs themselves, and more the recognition that the texts are the same. 
And these seams—like Birgitt Walz-Tylla's apparent claim to manhood, and our ability to 
quickly compare texts—suggest that these letters are part of a coordinated astroturfing 
campaign.  
 
So, who then is the speaker? The person who signed these letters? The person or people 
who wrote the original text, which was then distributed to these four scientists? These 
questions go directly to the third duty of a speaker in the realm of digital parrhesia: the 
duty to honestly represent oneself when speaking. These four letters share the same 
content, but differ slightly in their presentation and the ways in which their authors 
present themselves publically. All identify themselves as scientists, and some sign their 
letters with their academic titles, laying a public claim to be experts in their fields. The 
letters from Birk and Lick clearly state their professional affiliations; both work for 
BASF, a chemical company with interests in pesticide production. Walz-Tylla and Haber 
do not provide their professional affiliations. But no matter: a simple Google search 
reveals that Walz-Tylla is an employee of Bayer CropScience, and Haber is an employee 
of BASF. Both companies are industry stakeholders.  
 
Thus, what separately seem to be legitimate individual positions of experts are revealed 
to be the direct participation of industry. This discourse does not arise from the individual 
concern of scientists, but from what appears to be coordinated industry propaganda. An 
industrial agent almost certainly wrote the original text, and suggested the campaign to 
other industrial stakeholders. This actor, in fact, is the true author of the discourse, but 
stays in the shadows, uses different identities, and ultimately leaves its intention 
unclear—is the issue one of good science, or good business? In this debate, then, we can 
say that these four scientists—and whomever wrote their letters for them—do not respect 
parrhesia. While they may have attempted to exploit the ease of submitting digital 
feedback, the realm of digital parrhesia also affords the opportunity to uncover their 
campaign. Therefore, digital parrhesia and the techno-semiotic method reveal what we 
believe to be a clear case of astroturfing.  
 
Astroturfing Pinellas County, Florida: Secreting Racism 
 
Astroturfing can be professional, well-styled, and coordinated, as seen in the BASF and 
BayerCropScience employees submitting letters as individual stakeholders, even though 
the content thereof is so similar as to suggest a coordinated campaign by industrial 
stakeholders. Astroturfing can also be petty, but still astroturfing, when a public official 
spreads individual social biases and political accusations under pseudonyms.  
 
In 2010 and 2011, a commenter on the Web site of the St. Petersburg Times, a daily 
newspaper in Florida, posted a number of controversial comments under the pseudonym 
"Reality." The commenter complained about "race pimps" who would "walk around 
looking like an idiot thug trying to hold your pants up. Whitie isn't to blame for your 
ignorance." Reality also criticized what he saw as St. Petersburg's outsized number of 
"thug shootings" and "prostitute beatings," and also attacked two Pinellas County 
commissioners—in one case alleging that a commissioner helped a "developer friend" 
access funds from the county (DeCamp, 2011b).  
 
A reporter noticed that Reality often ended comments with the phrase "just say'n," a 
phrase also used by another Pinellas County commissioner named Norm Roche, and he 
noticed that Reality announced a new Web site in a comment—a Web site registered to 
Roche. Initially, this might not seem to be a case of astroturfing; after all, Roche was not 
manufacturing wide support for racism. However, when confronted by a reporter, Roche 
admitted that he posted both as "Reality" and as "Norm Roche," suggesting a desire to 
distance his public persona from the views of "Reality." And when critiquing elected 
officials, including his colleagues, he again used a pseudonym to distance Norm Roche 
from Reality. Even if the Reality persona was consistent and the author of Reality's 
comments believed them to be true, that one person operated two personae, whose 
opinions did not fully align (at least in public), suggested an effort to mislead or misdirect 
readers of those comments.  
 
The word "secreting" has two meanings: concealing in a hiding place, and forming then 
emanating a substance. Here, Roche used a pseudonym to conceal the origins of his 
controversial comments, and possibly to conceal his own controversial views. (It must be 
noted, however, that Roche has publicly denied being a racist or a homophobe.) At the 
came time, he used a pseudonym to distribute those controversial comments, and to do 
so, used a medium that permitted pseudonymous comments and integrated them with 
news stories. In this case, the journalist who uncovered the relationship between Reality 
and Norm Roche used something akin to the techno-semiotic method to do so, and we 
argue that the method works very well to analyze speech in this situation. 
 
As per the method, we first address issues related to the medium. Here, Roche's speech 
required a news product that offered an online commenting system. Such a system 
permits an exchange of ideas between readers who participate, and sometimes between 
readers and journalists, should journalists choose to respond to comments. Immediately, 
we see that these texts are polysemous—different readers interpret the meaning of news 
stories differently, including inscribing their own, sometimes divergent, meanings onto 
those texts.1 At the same time, we see how these texts become polyvocal—for readers 
who do not comment, the news product is the story plus the comment threads. Within 
such polyvocal texts, voices that threaten the peace of the community can easily be 
identified. In this case, a reporter identified outlandish claims by a commenter. These 
claims could not exist without the newspaper offering a comment thread, which offering, 
in turn, introduced polyvocality into its news product. The digital text therefore has the 
ability to reveal through its medium the plurality of voices that create and recreate new 
texts. 
 
Second, we address questions related to how the speech is distributed. In the case of these 
comment threads, reader comments are attached to the end of a news story. Online, the 
                                                        
1 A phenomenon readily seen in comment threads following all political stories, for example. 
St. Petersburg Times publishes stories along with the comments; at the end of the story, 
the reader must click a link reading "Join the discussion: Click to view comments, add 
yours." While other content exists on the page, ranging from advertisements to copyright 
information to links to other news stories, only links to the comments, or links that help 
readers repurpose the story by sharing or printing it, are directly connected to the story 
itself. When commenting, a reader becomes a reader-author; when sharing a story by 
email or on a blog, the reader becomes a reader-publisher. In both cases, a participating 
reader implicates herself in a case of digital parrhesia, especially because she must agree 
to "Comment policy and guidelines" which include, among others, the requirement that 
"Your comments must be truthful. You may not impersonate another user or a 
tampabay.com staff member by choosing a similar screen name. You must disclose 
conflicts of interest" (Tampabay.com, 2012). Finally, other commenters indicated a 
parrhesiastic situation, because they implicitly interrogated and summoned the criteria of 
digital parrhesia. On the story revealing that Reality was Norm Roche, many of the 137 
comments debated whether the publication had violated its own promises of privacy to its 
commenters, whether the reporter had used honest techniques to uncover this story, and 
whether a commenter should take responsibility for his comments by posting them under 
his real name.  
 
Next, we address questions about the content of the speech. The comments by Reality 
were often incendiary, supporting biases of some commenters and provoking outrage 
among others. Reader comments, in fact, operate as at least three different texts. First, 
comments exist in relation to the news story—expanding it, criticizing it, and opining on 
it. Second, comments exist in relation to other comments; they respond to previous 
comments while anticipating future ones. Third, comments exist as part of a complete 
news product, one that includes news story and all comments, that is served to non-
commenting readers. The digital text is at the crossroads of the journalist’s production of 
meaning and the public's reception and sometimes re-appropriation of it. The reporter 
who revealed Reality as Roche did so by understanding the first two content 
interrelationships—by identifying commonalities between supposedly different voices, 
and ultimately revealing them to be the same.  
 
Finally, we consider the speaker himself. All four of the levels of the techno-semiotic 
method interrelate, but questions of discourse are perhaps the most pervasive of all. 
Above, we have seen how online commenting systems promote polyvocal texts, and thus 
create opportunities for deviant speech. We also have seen that by posting comments, 
readers become reader-authors, and in doing so, implicate themselves in a parrhesiastic 
system. Further, even the most cursory look at the content of reader comments reveals 
that understanding their intertextual and multitextual nature allows us to see the different 
ways in which content may be deployed. Discourse, then, is overlaid on all of these. The 
question of who is commenting and why may be the fundamental question of digital 
ethos in online texts such as these. In this case, once the reporter marshaled his evidence 
and asked Roche if he was Reality, Roche admitted that his reasons for concealing his 
identity (at least part of the time) were entirely discursive. He told the reporter, "A lot of 
it can be rhetoric and rants. Unfortunately it's part of our communication base now, and 
you have to be part of it, you have to track it" (Decamp, 2011a).  
 
Thus, we see how a reporter used a process much like the techno-semiotic method to 
break a news story about a politician who concealed his identity while making possibly 
racist comments about his constituents. And we also see how different layers of meaning 
generated through the medium, its distribution, its content, and its author are all available 
to analyze the credibility of online speech.  
 
 
Conclusion: Digital parrhesia and digital communication texts 
 
Clearly, an application of digital parrhesia has the potential to evaluate and assess 
astroturfing that is spread through digital media. Under the parrhesia model, truth-claims 
are reviewed in three ways: whether they are true, whether the speaker believes that they 
are true, and whether the speaker is honestly representing herself. Again, parrhesia 
accommodates pseudonymous and anonymous speech because honesty does not require 
mapping a name onto a real speaker, but rather requires that the speaker honestly believes 
in and argues for her truth claims. The techno-semiotic method accounts for this, but it 
also has wider implications.  
 
As Nayar suggested, digital communication constitutes new communities (2010). This is 
not a new phenomenon—we have seen it before in the old bulletin board systems and 
chat rooms, and we see it today in online communities ranging from 4chan to Facebook 
groups. These communities, as all communities do, develop their own behavioral norms 
and mores. These norms help define the discursive space of digital parrhesia; the risks to 
a speaker for violating those norms—in the digital space, ranging from chastisement to 
banishment—help determine when and how the speaker will fulfill her duties to speak the 
truth, to believe that her truth-claim is indeed true, and to honestly represent herself and 
her belief. For astroturfers, the risk is that a secret propaganda campaign will be revealed, 
with consequences ranging from public shame to criminal liability.  
 
To operationalize digital parrhesia—to make it useable not only for academic critics, but 
to make a model that can be used to consider digital communication more broadly—we 
have integrated the medium and the speaker into our techno-semiotic method. Doing so 
solves a major problem with the sender-receiver model of communications, which 
manages to persist even when it is not appropriate. Under a sender-receiver model, texts 
can be recognized as univocal and polysemous—that is, readers can negotiate their own 
meanings with texts, even meanings that run counter to the preferred reading of a 
univocal author. But when texts become polyvocal, and when the medium itself—for 
example, an online news story with comments—creates polyvocality, the sender-receiver 
model falters.  
 
Polyvocality in digital media permits the exposure of astroturfers. In this chapter alone, 
we have seen fans of a product, a scholar (Allard-Huver, 2011) and a journalist 
(DeCamp, 2011a; DeCamp, 2011b) all use observations made through or use techniques 
reliant upon digital media to expose astroturfing that, itself, was at least partially 
executed through digital media. This suggests that polyvocal media and polyvocal texts, 
when functioning in a parrhesiastic way (that is to say, when discussing community 
issues in ways that hinge on acts of truth-telling), are especially appropriate subjects for 
the techno-semiotic analysis outlined in this chapter.  
 
The astroturfing cases outlined here—audience members uncovering that a popular 
science television show became a propaganda and advertising piece in France; the 
distribution of the PDF of a European Commission report compiling the feedback of 
stakeholders regarding pesticide use; and a journalist revealing that an elected official 
clandestinely stoked the fires of racism in Florida—suggest the versatility of both digital 
parrhesia as a theory and the techno-semiotic method as a method.  
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